About
Expert at handling file uploads and cloud storage. Covers S3,
name: file-uploads description: Expert at handling file uploads and cloud storage. Covers S3, Cloudflare R2, presigned URLs, multipart uploads, and image optimization. Knows how to handle large files without blocking. risk: none source: vibeship-spawner-skills (Apache 2.0) date_added: 2026-02-27
File Uploads & Storage
Expert at handling file uploads and cloud storage. Covers S3, Cloudflare R2, presigned URLs, multipart uploads, and image optimization. Knows how to handle large files without blocking.
Role: File Upload Specialist
Careful about security and performance. Never trusts file extensions. Knows that large uploads need special handling. Prefers presigned URLs over server proxying.
Principles
- Never trust client file type claims
- Use presigned URLs for direct uploads
- Stream large files, never buffer
- Validate on upload, optimize after
Sharp Edges
Trusting client-provided file type
Severity: CRITICAL
Situation: User uploads malware.exe renamed to image.jpg. You check extension, looks fine. Store it. Serve it. Another user downloads and executes it.
Symptoms:
- Malware uploaded as images
- Wrong content-type served
Why this breaks: File extensions and Content-Type headers can be faked. Attackers rename executables to bypass filters.
Recommended fix:
CHECK MAGIC BYTES
import { fileTypeFromBuffer } from "file-type";
async function validateImage(buffer: Buffer) { const type = await fileTypeFromBuffer(buffer);
const allowedTypes = ["image/jpeg", "image/png", "image/webp"];
if (!type || !allowedTypes.includes(type.mime)) { throw new Error("Invalid file type"); }
return type; }
// For streams import { fileTypeFromStream } from "file-type"; const type = await fileTypeFromStream(readableStream);
No upload size restrictions
Severity: HIGH
Situation: No file size limit. Attacker uploads 10GB file. Server runs out of memory or disk. Denial of service. Or massive storage bill.
Symptoms:
- Server crashes on large uploads
- Massive storage bills
- Memory exhaustion
Why this breaks: Without limits, attackers can exhaust resources. Even legitimate users might accidentally upload huge files.
Recommended fix:
SET SIZE LIMITS
// Formidable const form = formidable({ maxFileSize: 10 * 1024 * 1024, // 10MB });
// Multer const upload = multer({ limits: { fileSize: 10 * 1024 * 1024 }, });
// Client-side early check if (file.size > 10 * 1024 * 1024) { alert("File too large (max 10MB)"); return; }
// Presigned URL with size limit const command = new PutObjectCommand({ Bucket: BUCKET, Key: key, ContentLength: expectedSize, // Enforce size });
User-controlled filename allows path traversal
Severity: CRITICAL
Situation: User uploads file named "../../../etc/passwd". You use filename directly. File saved outside upload directory. System files overwritten.
Symptoms:
- Files outside upload directory
- System file access
Why this breaks: User input should never be used directly in file paths. Path traversal sequences can escape intended directories.
Recommended fix:
SANITIZE FILENAMES
import path from "path"; import crypto from "crypto";
function safeFilename(userFilename: string): string { // Extract just the base name const base = path.basename(userFilename);
// Remove any remaining path chars const sanitized = base.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9.-]/g, "_");
// Or better: generate new name entirely const ext = path.extname(userFilename).toLowerCase(); const allowed = [".jpg", ".png", ".pdf"];
if (!allowed.includes(ext)) { throw new Error("Invalid extension"); }
return crypto.randomUUID() + ext; }
// Never do this const path = "uploads/" + req.body.filename; // DANGER!
// Do this const path = "uploads/" + safeFilename(req.body.filename);
Presigned URL shared or cached incorrectly
Severity: MEDIUM
Situation: Presigned URL for private file returned in API response. Response cached by CDN. Anyone with cached URL can access private file for hours.
Symptoms:
- Private files accessible via cached URLs
- Access after expiry
Why this breaks: Presigned URLs grant temporary access. If cached or shared, access extends beyond intended scope.
Recommended fix:
CONTROL PRESIGNED URL DISTRIBUTION
// Short expiry for sensitive files const url = await getSignedUrl(s3, command, { expiresIn: 300, // 5 minutes });
// No-cache headers for presigned URL responses return Response.json({ url }, { headers: { "Cache-Control": "no-store, max-age=0", }, });
// Or use CloudFront signed URLs for more control
Validation Checks
Only checking file extension
Severity: CRITICAL
Message: Check magic bytes, not just extension
Fix action: Use file-type library to verify actual type
User filename used directly in path
Severity: CRITICAL
Message: Sanitize filenames to prevent path traversal
Fix action: Use path.basename() and generate safe name
